Voters back Maldives change in foreign policy - 360
Athaulla A Rasheed
Published on May 1, 2024
A parliamentary supermajority is a chance for Mohammad Muizzu’s government to overhaul foreign policy, but Maldives thrives by embracing all willing partners.
Maldives is changing quickly.
The country has held two elections within the past seven months, and both signal the country is changing drastically under Dr Mohamed Muizzu’s leadership.
Muizzu came to power following September 2023’s presidential election on the back of an “India out” slogan. This agenda drove nationalist sentiments against foreign influence in Maldives.
Upon taking office, his government initiated the withdrawal of a regiment of Indian military personnel based in Maldives to operate two helicopters and a Dornier aircraft for search and rescue operations.
It was followed by meetings and various agreements with Turkey and China which both raised India’s anxiety.
Last September’s landslide has now been cemented with a supermajority in the parliamentary election held on April 21, 2024. Muizzu’s ruling party, the People’s National Congress (PNC), has secured more than two-thirds majority of the 93-seat parliament.
While Miuzzu’s inauguration address last November prioritised the interests of the Maldivian people and national sovereignty, protection of human rights and upholding international law, the combined result of the presidential and parliamentary elections bring into sharp focus the perceived tug-of-war for Maldives allegiances in the region.
India and China both see Maldives as a strategic ally in their posturing for regional dominance.
Such ‘on and off’ external tension has shaped the way in which outside observers today frame the policy shifts in Maldives following elections.
With a bigger majority, it remains to be seen if the government will be less inclined to bend towards political pressure from the likes of India and China.
But the reality is not so simple, with Miuzzu intent on Maldives playing a more balanced strategic game, welcoming relations with all parties.
During the 2013-2018 rule of former president Abdulla Yameen, the government was met with external pressure, namely India and its like-minded Indo-Pacific allies, due to expanded foreign investments from China.
The pressure was eased only after Yameen’s predecessor Ibrahim Mohamed Solih’s government reiterated the ‘India-First’ policy in 2018 — a decision making India the preferred country for Maldives in its policy decision making.
In the past, any incoming president would normally make India or Sri Lanka their first international port of call for diplomatic visits.
However, Muizzu chose Turkey as the first country to visit after his inauguration. As a result, Maldives today benefits from a sophisticated high-level technology platform composed of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 tactical drones.
Then, in January 2024, Muizzu visited China and as part of the new initiatives met with his counterpart, president Xi Jinping, and signed around 20 agreements with China — including security related engagements. In February, the movement of the Chinese research, Xiang Yang Hong 03, in Maldives waters received high criticism from India.
All of these swirling, competing interests do little to benefit policy choices as the rising tension became pegged to Sunday’s election results, creating future worries both in Maldives and abroad.
A mere securitisation of Maldives foreign engagements could in fact undermine the national and foreign policy objectives of such a small state.
Maldives is a tourism-dependent developmental state. Its island infrastructure, supporting a multi-billion dollar industry, has been continuously threatened by climate change.
Mega-infrastructure development projects have prevented coastal erosion and tidal swells. Therefore, the true security priority for the Maldives is to ensure climate-resilient development in its foreign partnerships, which are an important part of the development agenda.
Muizzu does not appear to be interested in Maldives jostling as part of a big powers security competition expressing the desire for Maldives to partner with all countries, including India, the US and Japan — all members of the Quad, which was created to keep China’s perceived expansionism in check.
The engagement in defence and security partnerships is a unique opportunity for Maldives — a country facing multifaceted security concerns such as maritime crimes compounded by climate impacts.
In this respect, a strategic approach to security cooperation can be started by identifying the capability gaps — Maldives projects a strong economy with high human development index. This can involve enhancing investments to fill those gaps by strengthening the existing joint operations.
The February 2024 Dosti exercise between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka was an indication of continued, successful collaboration between Maldives and India’s defence forces.
Other Indo-Pacific partners, including the US and Australia, have improved domestic-focused diplomatic platforms to help mutual capability building in defence cooperation.
Australia opened its Malé-based High Commission in 2023. The establishment has enhanced people-to-people and institutional links, including defence sector cooperation, between the Canberra and Malé.
As part of institutional links, research engagements, such as ANU’s ongoing research on Indian Ocean security issues involving Maldives defence and security sector, also indicate Canberra’s role in obtaining deeper understanding of Maldives’ regional security interests.
The recent return of the Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE) to Maldives further stresses the importance of the shared importance Maldives and Australia have placed in the Indian Ocean security.
Mutually beneficial projects in the defence and security sectors can achieve a high level of investor confidence and success for Maldives. Rather than settling on isolationist policies, like-minded Indo-Pacific partners need to engage domestically and tease out mutual opportunities rather than focus on total victory.
Athaulla A Rasheed is a PhD candidate at The Australian National University. His focus is on international relations and security of small island developing states (SIDS). He is a former foreign service officer and diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maldives, and holds a PhD in political science from University of Queensland, Australia.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.